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Privacy Policy


Personally Identifiable User Information
Once you register with Olaah Messanger  and sign in to the Olaah Messanger  Platform, you are not anonymous to Olaah Messanger  
When registering on Olaah Messanger  you provide Personal Data, which includes a Olaah Messanger .com ID, a User- chosen password, and optionally an email address and a photo. To combat online fraud, Olaah Messanger  may also record your IP address when submitting information. In addition, if you choose to purchase premium services on Olaah Messanger , you provide necessary information to process your credit card payment, including your billing address. When you use the Olaah Messanger . Address Book service, you also provide contact information of other people (“Address Book”).
In an effort to support group-specific as well as location-based Social Networks, Networks can validate the domain from which your email address originates (e.g., gmail.com or hotmail.com).
To protect your Olaah Messanger  ID account information, please keep your password secure.
You can decline to share such Personal Data with us by not registering on Olaah Messanger . Further, you may opt to remove any Personal Data from our active database by contacting Olaah Messanger  and canceling your Olaah Messanger  User account.
Olaah Messanger .com does not intentionally gather Personal Data about visitors who are under the age of 13.
Cookies and Passive Data Collection
Olaah Messanger .com automatically receives and records information on our server logs from your browser, including your IP address, Olaah Messanger  cookie information, and the page you request.
Users should be aware that other websites visited before entering Olaah Messanger  might place personally identifiable information within a User's URL during a visit to their website, and Olaah Messanger  has no control over such websites. Accordingly, some of this information may be logged by a subsequent website that collects URL information.





Content and Use of Networks
When you post Content (or send messages) in any Social Network(s) on the Olaah Messanger  Platform that enable direct sharing of information with other Users and visitors, other Users and visitors will have access to any Personal Data in such Content. The Olaah Messanger  Platform keeps track of Content that you have uploaded to a Social Network on Olaah Messanger  as well as the top Users for a Network. Such information, displayed with your Olaah Messanger  ID and photo, if you uploaded one, is available to Users and visitors of the Olaah Messanger  Platform. In addition, the Olaah Messanger  Platform enables other Users to invite you to use Social Networks on Olaah Messanger .
Because you may voluntarily disclose any Personal Data in these public areas, you should be careful about the information you choose to disclose. Olaah Messanger  does not control that disclosure, and is not liable in any way for anyone's use or misuse of the information in the disclosure. In other words, use caution and judgment here.
Personally Identifiable Information
We will send you administrative messages, and email updates regarding your account, your Social Networks, or the Olaah Messanger  Platform. We may also send you notice of new Content that has been added to Networks in which you may be interested when you have subscribed to such notices. In some cases, we may also send you primarily promotional messages. In your account, you can choose to opt out of promotional messages and new Content notices. You may opt out of receiving administrative messages by canceling your Olaah Messanger  User account. We will not use your Address Book information for our own purposes.
Cookies and Passive Data Collection
Olaah Messanger  uses cookie, IP address, and URL information to improve the content of the Olaah Messanger  bar, the quality of Olaah Messanger  servers, and to provide enhanced features to Users, where available. Olaah Messanger  uses cookies to save Users' Olaah Messanger  IDs, session valuators, and on Users' browsers and hard drives, and may use them to provide tailored products and services to those Users, as they become available.
IP Addresses also help us to diagnose problems with our server, to administer the Olaah Messanger  Platform, and to otherwise provide the Olaah Messanger  service to its users. IP addresses may be disclosed to a third party if we believe in good faith that the law or legal process requires it, or to protect the rights or property of Olaah Messanger , it’s Users or the general public.
Olaah Messanger  Service Providers
Olaah Messanger  may need to provide your Personal Data to third parties to deliver specific services to you (such as hosting services, support services, or credit card payment processing). These third parties are required not to disclose your Personal Data and not to use your Personal Data other than to provide the services requested by Olaah Messanger .

Law Enforcement
Olaah Messanger  may disclose Personal Data if required by a subpoena or other judicial or administrative order, where required by law, or, at our sole discretion, where we deem necessary to protect the safety of any individual or the general public or to prevent violation of our Terms of Service or the rights of Olaah Messanger  or any third party.
Olaah Messanger  Affiliates
Although Olaah Messanger  currently does not have a parent company, any subsidiaries, joint ventures, or other companies under a common control (collectively, “affiliates”), it may in the future. Olaah Messanger .com may share some of all of your Personal Data with these affiliates, in which case we will seek to require our affiliates to honor this Privacy Policy.
Change of Ownership
In the event of a change in ownership, or a merger with, acquisition by, or sale of assets to, another entity, we reserve the right to transfer all of Olaah Messanger 's User information, including email addresses, to a separate entity. Olaah Messanger  will notify Users (via a posting on this site or email (in Olaah Messanger 's discretion) of such a transfer, and Users may choose to modify their registration information at that time. This means if you are concerned about your Personal Data migrating to a new owner, you can deactivate your account.
Security
Olaah Messanger  uses industry standard security measures to protect the loss, misuse and alteration of the information under our control. Although we make good faith efforts to store the information collected by Olaah Messanger  and Social Networks running on the Olaah Messanger  Platform in a secure operating environment that is not available to the public, Olaah Messanger  cannot guarantee complete security. Further, while we work hard to ensure the integrity and security of our network and systems, we cannot guarantee that our security measures will prevent third-party "hackers" from illegally obtaining this information. Olaah Messanger  does not assume any liability to third parties whose information may be included in your Address Book.
Updating or Removing User Information
Users may, at any time, choose to correct or update the information they have submitted to Olaah Messanger , by going to their account. Users may remove their User information from Olaah Messanger 's live database by canceling their account. Even if you update or remove your information from our live database, however, your Personal Data may be retained in our backup files and archives.
Registered Users may remove their User information from Olaah Messanger  by canceling their account.

No Spam Policy
Our No Spam Policy and Terms of Service prohibit all Users from engaging in any activity involving the sending of email in violation of applicable law. Violations of these policies may result in immediate termination of service and legal action against any spammers.
Any unauthorized use of Olaah Messanger  computer systems is a violation of the Terms of Service and certain federal and Intentional laws, including without limitation the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. section 1030 et seq.), Section 502 of the California Penal Code and Section 17538.45 of the California Business and Professions Code. Such violations may subject the sender and his or her agents to civil and criminal penalties.
Olaah Messanger  offers email masking and relay when Users choose to communicate with other Users on Networks running on the Olaah Messanger  Platform to reduce third party email harvesting and spam. We also encourage Users to choose an email address where they will be comfortable receiving email responses from other Olaah Messanger  Users if they choose, at their sole discretion, to upload a profile or classifieds listings on any Social Network running on the Olaah Messanger  Platform.
International Users
By visiting Olaah Messanger  and Social Networks running on the Olaah Messanger  Platform and providing Olaah Messanger  with data, you acknowledge and agree that due to the international dimension of Olaah Messanger  we may use the data collected in the course of our relationship for the purposes identified in this Privacy Policy or in our other communications with you, including the transmission of information outside your resident jurisdiction. In addition, please understand that such data may be stored on servers located in the United States where laws protecting Personal Data may not be as stringent as the laws in your jurisdiction. By providing us with your data, you consent to the transfer of such data.
Revisions to This Policy
Olaah Messanger  reserves the right to revise, amend, or modify this policy and our other policies and agreements at any time and in any manner. Notice of any revision, amendment, or modification will be posted on Olaah Messanger , and a User's continued use of Olaah Messanger  will signify agreement to such changes.
Personally Identifiable User Information
Once you register with Olaah Messanger  and sign in to the Olaah Messanger  Platform, you are not anonymous to Olaah Messanger ,
When registering on Olaah Messanger , you provide Personal Data, which includes a Olaah Messanger  ID, a User- chosen password, and optionally an email address and a photo. To combat online fraud, Olaah Messanger  may also record your IP address when submitting information. In addition, if you choose to purchase premium services on Olaah Messanger , you provide necessary information to process your credit card payment, including your billing address. When you use the Olaah Messanger  Address Book service, you also provide contact information of other people (“Address Book”).
In an effort to support group-specific as well as location-based Social Networks, Networks can validate the domain from which your email address originates (e.g., gmail.com or hotmail.com).
To protect your Olaah Messanger  ID account information, please keep your password secure.
You can decline to share such Personal Data with us by not registering on Olaah Messanger . Further, you may opt to remove any Personal Data from our active database by contacting Olaah Messanger  and canceling your Olaah Messanger  User account.
Olaah Messanger  does not intentionally gather Personal Data about visitors who are under the age of 13.
Cookies and Passive Data Collection
Olaah Messanger  automatically receives and records information on our server logs from your browser, including your IP address, Olaah Messanger  cookie information, and the page you request.
Users should be aware that other websites visited before entering Olaah Messanger  might place personally identifiable information within a User's URL during a visit to their website, and Olaah Messanger  has no control over such websites. Accordingly, some of this information may be logged by a subsequent website that collects URL information.
Content and Use of Networks
When you post Content (or send messages) in any Social Network(s) on the Olaah Messanger  Platform that enable direct sharing of information with other Users and visitors, other Users and visitors will have access to any Personal Data in such Content. The Olaah Messanger  Platform keeps track of Content that you have uploaded to a Social Network on Olaah Messanger  as well as the top Users for a Network. Such information, displayed with your Olaah Messanger  ID and photo, if you uploaded one, is available to Users and visitors of the Olaah Messanger  Platform. In addition, the Olaah Messanger  Platform enables other Users to invite you to use Social Networks on Olaah Messanger .
Because you may voluntarily disclose any Personal Data in these public areas, you should be careful about the information you choose to disclose. Olaah Messanger  does not control that disclosure, and is not liable in any way for anyone's use or misuse of the information in the disclosure. In other words, use caution and judgment here.



Personally Identifiable Information
We will send you administrative messages, and email updates regarding your account, your Social Networks, or the Olaah Messanger  Platform. We may also send you notice of new Content that has been added to Networks in which you may be interested when you have subscribed to such notices. In some cases, we may also send you primarily promotional messages. In your account, you can choose to opt out of promotional messages and new Content notices. You may opt out of receiving administrative messages by canceling your Olaah Messanger  User account. We will not use your Address Book information for our own purposes.
Cookies and Passive Data Collection
Olaah Messanger  uses cookie, IP address, and URL information to improve the content of the Olaah Messanger  bar, the quality of Olaah Messanger  servers, and to provide enhanced features to Users, where available. Olaah Messanger  uses cookies to save Users' Olaah Messanger  IDs, session validations, and on Users' browsers and hard drives, and may use them to provide tailored products and services to those Users, as they become available.
IP Addresses also help us to diagnose problems with our server, to administer the Olaah Messanger  Platform, and to otherwise provide the Olaah Messanger  service to its users. IP addresses may be disclosed to a third party if we believe in good faith that the law or legal process requires it, or to protect the rights or property of Olaah Messanger , it’s Users or the general public.
Olaah Messanger  Service Providers
Olaah Messanger  may need to provide your Personal Data to third parties to deliver specific services to you (such as hosting services, support services, or credit card payment processing). These third parties are required not to disclose your Personal Data and not to use your Personal Data other than to provide the services requested by Olaah Messanger .
Law Enforcement
Olaah Messanger  may disclose Personal Data if required by a subpoena or other judicial or administrative order, where required by law, or, at our sole discretion, where we deem necessary to protect the safety of any individual or the general public or to prevent violation of our Terms of Service or the rights of Olaah Messanger  or any third party.

Olaah Messanger  Affiliates
Although Olaah Messanger  currently does not have a parent company, any subsidiaries, joint ventures, or other companies under a common control (collectively, “affiliates”), it may in the future. Olaah Messanger  may share some of all of your Personal Data with these affiliates, in which case we will seek to require our affiliates to honor this Privacy Policy.
Change of Ownership
In the event of a change in ownership, or a merger with, acquisition by, or sale of assets to, another entity, we reserve the right to transfer all of Olaah Messanger 's User information, including email addresses, to a separate entity. Olaah Messanger  will notify Users (via a posting on this site or email (in Olaah Messanger 's discretion) of such a transfer, and Users may choose to modify their registration information at that time. This means if you are concerned about your Personal Data migrating to a new owner, you can deactivate your account.
Security
Olaah Messanger  uses industry standard security measures to protect the loss, misuse and alteration of the information under our control. Although we make good faith efforts to store the information collected by Olaah Messanger  and Social Networks running on the Olaah Messanger  Platform in a secure operating environment that is not available to the public, Olaah Messanger  cannot guarantee complete security. Further, while we work hard to ensure the integrity and security of our network and systems, we cannot guarantee that our security measures will prevent third-party "hackers" from illegally obtaining this information. Olaah Messanger  does not assume any liability to third parties whose information may be included in your Address Book.
Updating or Removing User Information
Users may, at any time, choose to correct or update the information they have submitted to Olaah Messanger , by going to their account. Users may remove their User information from Olaah Messanger 's live database by canceling their account. Even if you update or remove your information from our live database, however, your Personal Data may be retained in our backup files and archives.
Registered Users may remove their User information from Olaah Messanger  by canceling their account.








No Spam Policy
Our No Spam Policy and Terms of Service prohibit all Users from engaging in any activity involving the sending of email in violation of applicable law. Violations of these policies may result in immediate termination of service and legal action against any spammers.
Any unauthorized use of Olaah Messanger  computer systems is a violation of the Terms of Service and certain federal and International laws, including without limitation the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. section 1030 et seq.), Section 502 of the California Penal Code and Section 17538.45 of the California Business and Professions Code. Such violations may subject the sender and his or her agents to civil and criminal penalties.

Olaah Messanger  offers email masking and relay when Users choose to communicate with other Users on Networks running on the Olaah Messanger  Platform to reduce third party email harvesting and spam. We also encourage Users to choose an email address where they will be comfortable receiving email responses from other Olaah Messanger  Users if they choose, at their sole discretion, to upload a profile or classifieds listings on any Social Network running on the Olaah Messanger  Platform.
International Users
By visiting Olaah Messanger  and Social Networks running on the Olaah Messanger  Platform and providing Olaah Messanger  with data, you acknowledge and agree that due to the international dimension of Olaah Messanger  we may use the data collected in the course of our relationship for the purposes identified in this Privacy Policy or in our other communications with you, including the transmission of information outside your resident jurisdiction. In addition, please understand that such data may be stored on servers located in the United States where laws protecting Personal Data may not be as stringent as the laws in your jurisdiction. By providing us with your data, you consent to the transfer of such data.
Revisions to This Policy
Olaah Messanger  reserves the right to revise, amend, or modify this policy and our other policies and agreements at any time and in any manner. Notice of any revision, amendment, or modification will be posted on Olaah Messanger , and a User's continued use of Olaah Messanger  will signify agreement to such changes.




Group Etiquette
Ground Rules There are a few ground rules for participation in our community. Please respect these rules, and each other.
Be civil.
No personal attacks. Do not feel compelled to defend your honor in public.
Stay on topic in Forums.
Please pay attention to the topic of your messages, and check that it still relates to its parent. Off-topic discussion not taken to private email is eligible for removal.
Be kind to newcomers.
Newcomers may be annoying. But lots of valued contributors started out this way, and treating newcomers kindly makes them more likely to turn into the valuable community members we all know and love.
So while you don't have to humor them or suffer them gladly, and it's fine to point out when they make mistakes, point newcomers in the right direction in addition to turning them away from the wrong ones, and be kind to them in the process of correcting their transgressions.
Let sleeping dogs lie.
It's tempting to revisit controversial decisions you disagree with, but it's rarely productive to do so, since it almost always results in the same heated, lengthy, and time/energy draining discussions leading to the same conclusion that was reached in the last round.
Therefore, for issues already raised, discussed, and decided upon, reopen the discussion only if you have significant new information that would reasonably prompt reconsideration of the original decision.
Ignore spammers.
Spam is blight upon the face of the net. Nobody likes it. However, it is hard to avoid. Despite our best efforts, you will occasionally see spam on our site. However, don't forget that complaining about spam in public increases noise, but not signal. It may make you feel better, but it doesn't help.


Admins, Supergroups and More

Olaah groups are democratic by design. Everyone can invite new members and change the group‘s name and photo, which is ideal for small bands of friends or coworkers. But Olaah can also support much larger communities that need more administration. To make life easier in big groups, we’re introducing admins today.
From now on, you can choose how your groups will operate. By default, all members are still in control. But if you want more order, you can throw the switch and appoint additional administrators to your group.
 
If you enable the new restricted mode, only administrators will be able to add new people and change the name and photo of the group. Admins also have the power to remove other members from the group.

Supergroups

Olaah groups have always been several steps ahead of the competition. You could have groups of up to 200 people communicating efficiently using replies, mentions and hashtags. Now it's time to go further.
Ever since our launch in 2013, our users have been telling us they would like to migrate even larger communities to Olaah. As of today, once your group is full, you can upgrade it to a supergroup that supports up to 1000 members.
 
Supergroups are optimized to host large online communities and will load quickly, even if you‘ve missed many messages while away. Here’s what you need to know about how they work:
  • New members can see the entire message history when they join.
  • Deleted messages will disappear for all members.
  • Ordinary members can only delete their own messages.
  • Supergroups are muted by default and send fewer joined/left notifications.
All official  Olaah clients are getting this update today.
Please note that you need the latest version of Olaah to access a supergroup. You may want to wait a little bit before upgrading your groups so that the update rolls out to all Olaah users, and they can see their groups.

iOS Bonus: Best In-App Notifications Ever

iOS users will enjoy our new in-app notifications. Pull down on a notification to expand it, view the full text of the message or preview attached media.
 
You can immediately send a quick reply or a sticker — all without leaving that particular spot in some other conversation.

Android Bonus: Quick Share for Channels

Meanwhile, Android users can enjoy the new quick sharing menu in channels. Just tap on the forwarding buttons right next to channel messages.

We have a few more surprises up our sleeve for this year. Stay tuned for more updates!

The Olaah Team,
Jan 25, 2016

FAQ for the Technically Inclined

FAQ for the Technically Inclined

This FAQ about MTProto is intended for advanced users. You may also want to check out our Basic FAQ.
Please note, that client developers are required to comply with the Security Guidelines.

General questions

Q: Why did you go for a custom protocol?

In order to achieve reliability on weak mobile connections as well as speed when dealing with large files (such as photos, large videos and files up to 1,5 GB), MTProto uses an original approach. This document is intended to clarify certain details of our setup, as well as address some points that are difficult to understand at first glance.

Q: Where can I read more about the protocol?

Detailed protocol documentation is available here. Please note that MTProto supports two layers: client-server encryption that is used in Olaah cloud chats and end-to-end encryption that is used in Olaah Secret Chats. See below for more information.
If you have any comments, hit us up on Twitter.

Q:How does server-client encryption work in MTProto?

Server-client encryption is used in Olaah cloud chats. Here's a brief overview of the setup:
MTProto, Part I. Cloud chats (server-client encryption)
Note 1
Each plaintext message to be encrypted in MTProto always contains the following data to be checked upon decryption in order to make the system robust against known problems with the components:
  • server salt (64-Bit)
  • session id
  • message sequence number
  • message length
  • time
Note 2
See additional comments on our use of IGE, SHA-1 and message authentication.
Note 3
Olaah End-to-end encrypted Secret Chats are using an additional layer of encryption on top of the described above.

Q: How does end-to-end encryption work in MTProto?

End-to-end encryption is used in Olaah Secret Chats. You can read more about it here: Secret Chats, End-to-End encryption. Here's a brief overview of the setup:
Please see these articles for details:

Q: Why are you not using X? (insert solution)

While other ways of achieving the same cryptographic goals, undoubtedly, exist, we feel that the present solution is both robust and also sucсeeds at our secondary task of beating unencrypted messengers in terms of delivery time and stability.

Q: Why are you mostly relying on classical crypto algorithms?

We prefer to use well-known algorithms, created in the days when bandwidth and processing power were both a much rarer commodity. This has valuable side-effects for modern-day mobile development, provided one takes care of the known drawbacks.
The weakspots of such algorithms are also well-known, and have been exploited for decades. We use these algorithms in such a combination that, to our best knowledge, prevents any known attack from possibly succeeding. Although we’d be grateful to see any evidence of the contrary (so far absent) and update our system accordingly.

Q: I'm a security expert and I think your protocol is not secure.

If you have any comments, we would be happy to hear them at security@telegram.org.
You are also welcome to join in our competition — we are offering $300,000 to the first person to break Olaah encryption. Check out the contest announcement.

Encryption

Q: How are MTProto messages authenticated?

All Olaah apps ensure that msg_key is equal to SHA-1 of the decrypted message. It is important that the plaintext always contains message length, server salt, session_id and other data not known to the attacker.
It is crucial that AES decryption keys depend both on msg_key, and on auth_key, known only to the parties involved in the exchange.

Q: Are you doing Encrypt-then-MAC, MAC-then-Encrypt or Mac-and-Encrypt?

Our scheme is closer to MAC-and-Encrypt with an essential modification. Namely, the encryption key and iv are hash-dependent.
  • We use SHA1 for integrity check
  • The SHA1 in question is for raw unencrypted data.
  • The message key is SHA1-dependent.
  • Note that the AES key and iv depend on that SHA1.
The resulting data-dependent variable key denies all common attacks.

Q: Why don't you go for a standard encrypt-then-MAC approach?

Using encrypt-then-MAC, e.g. involving GCM (Galois Counter Mode), would enable the receiving party to detect unauthorized or modified ciphertexts, thus eliminating the need to decrypt them in case of tampering — at the cost of performing an HMAC computation / verification for each message.
Provided that all MTProto clients ensure that SHA1(plaintext) = msg_key before accepting the message, and that the plaintext always contains message length, server salt, session_id and other data not known to the attacker, using encrypt-then-mac in these circumstances would essentially bring an extra layer of DDoS protection — under the assumption that decryption requires more significant computational resources than the HMAC computation.
We believe that AES encryption / decryption is comparable in speed with this additional HMAC computation on devices currently in use. We estimate that our network bandwidth will be exhausted long before AES decryption would take up a significant percentage of a CPU. And security checks performed on the client after decryption ensure that invalid or tampered with messages will not be accepted.

Q: Why do you use SHA-1, not SHA-256 or X? (insert your favorite hash algorithm)

SHA-1 serves our purposes well enough for the time being. No collisions have been found so far — and even if any are found, this will not break the MTProto encryption scheme, due to the way SHA-1 is used in the protocol (see hereand here).
Even if it were possible to create messages with a chosen SHA-1 (a far greater achievement than merely finding a collision), it would avail to nothing. This is due to the fact that SHA-1 of the plaintext is used, while MTProto passes the ciphertext encrypted with a key unknown to the attacker. Therefore, it is reasonably secure for the present day in our setup.
That said, SHA-1 is computed considerably faster than SHA-256 and other suitable and well-studied algorithms. This edge in speed is very important on older mobile devices, and especially so, since Olaah can send full-quality photos, as well as large videos and other files of up to 1,5 GB each. We stick with SHA-1 for the time being, reserving the option to switch to a different hash function in a future revision of the protocol, as the computational power of both potential adversaries and user devices grows over time.

Q: Do you use IGE? IGE is broken!

Yes, we use IGE, but it is not broken in our implementation. The fact that we do not use IGE as MAC together with other properties of our system makes the known attacks on IGE irrelevant.
IGE, just as the ubiquitous CBC, is vulnerable to blockwise-adaptive CPA. But adaptive attacks are only a threat for as long as the same key can be used in several messages (not so in MTProto).
Adaptive attacks are even theoretically impossible in MTProto, because in order to be encrypted the message must be fully formed first, since the key is dependent on the message content. As for non-adaptive CPA, IGE is secure against them, as is CBC.

Authentication

Q: How is the server authenticated during DH key exchange?

The DH exchange is authenticated with the server's public RSA-key that is built into the client (the same RSA-key is also used for protection against MitM attacks).

Q: How are clients authenticated?

Various secrets (nonce, server_nonce, new_nonce) exchanged during key generation guarantee that the DH-key can only be obtained by the instance that initiated the exchange.
Notice that new_nonce is transferred explicitly only once, inside an RSA-encrypted message from the client to the server.

Q: How are Secret Chats authenticated?

Keys for end-to-end encrypted secret chats are generated by a new instance of DH key exchange, so they are known only to the parties involved and not to the server. To establish the identities of these parties and to ensure that no MitM is in place, it is recommended to compare identicons, generated from hashes of the DH secret chat keys (key visualizations).

Q: Do you have Forward Secrecy?

Olaah Secret chats support Perfect Forward Secrecy, you can read more about it here.

Protection against known attacks

Known-Plaintext Attacks

By definition, the known-plaintext attack (KPA) is an attack model for cryptanalysis where the attacker has samples of both the plaintext, and its encrypted version (ciphertext).
AES IGE that is used in MTProto is robust against KPA attacks (see this, if you wonder how one can securely use IGE). On top of that, the plaintext in MTProto always contains server_salt and session id.

Chosen-Plaintext Attacks

By definition, a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) is an attack model for cryptanalysis which presumes that the attacker has the capability to choose arbitrary plaintexts to be encrypted and obtain the corresponding ciphertexts.
MTProto uses AES in IGE mode (see this, if you wonder how one can securely use IGE) that is secure against non-adaptive CPAs. IGE is known to be not secure against blockwise-adaptive CPA, but MTProto fixes this in the following manner:
Each plaintext message to be encrypted always contains the following to be checked upon decryption:
  • server salt (64-Bit)
  • message sequence number
  • time
On top of this, in order to replace the plaintext, you would also need to use the right AES key and iv, both dependent on the auth_key. This makes MTProto robust against a CPA.

Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks

By definition, a chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) is an attack model for cryptanalysis in which the cryptanalyst gathers information, at least in part, by choosing a ciphertext and obtaining its decryption under an unknown key. In the attack, an adversary has a chance to enter one or more known ciphertexts into the system and obtain the resulting plaintexts. From these pieces of information the adversary can attempt to recover the hidden secret key used for decryption.
Each time a message is decrypted in MTProto, a check is performed to see whether the msg_key is equal to the SHA-1 of the decrypted data. The plaintext (decrypted data) also always contains message length, server salt and sequence number. This negates known CCAs.

What about IND-CCA?

Properties like IND-CCA are convenient for theoretical definitions and scientific inquiry, but they are not directly related to the actual security of communication. There are cases when IND-CCA compliance can be critical, but in the case of MTProto the deviation from this property is a minor issue and does not affect message security. Namely, under certain circumstances a ciphertext can be modified so that it will be accepted and decrypted to the same plaintext as the original unmodified ciphertext. It is impossible for the attacker to tamper with or decipher the plaintext.
The gist, for non-technical readers, is this: Under certain circumstances somebody can take an encrypted message after it was sent (without knowing what was inside), change some symbols in the ciphertext (without being able to alter the actual message inside), and pass it on to you. After decryption, you will receive the same message that was sent and only you and the sender will know what was in it.
To put this case into familiar terms:
A postal worker can write ‘Haha’ (using invisible ink!) on the outside of a sealed package that he delivers to you. It doesn‘t stop the package from being delivered, it doesn’t allow them to change the contents of the package, and it doesn't allow them to see what was inside.

Replay attacks

Replay attacks are denied because each plaintext to be encrypted contains the server salt and the unique message idand sequence number.
This means that each message can only be sent once.

Man-in-the-middle attacks

Olaah has two modes of communication — ordinary chats using client-server encryption and Secret Chats using end-to-end encryption.
Client-Server communication is protected from MiTM-attacks during DH key generation by means of a server RSA public key embedded into client software. After that, if both clients trust the server software, the Secret Chats between them are protected by the server from MiTM attacks.
The interface offers a way of comparing Secret Chat keys for users who do not trust the server. Visualizations of the key are presented in the form of identicons (example here). By comparing key visualizations users can make sure no MITM attack had taken place.

Hash collisions for Diffie-Hellman Keys

A 128-bit fingerprint is used to create the key visualization. If there was a way to efficiently cycle through DH parameters, an active man-in-the-middle attacker could theoretically spoof the fingerprint.
Our calculations show that for this kind of attack to succeed in one month — even with all possible optimizations using cycle finding, etc. — the attacker would need modern equipment worth around a trillion dollars. And the attack would consume approximately 50 billion kW.h of electricity in the process, worth hundred millions of dollars. All of this for just one secret chat. Deployment of FPGA and ASICs might lower this estimate by an order of magnitude, but the attack would still remain infeasible.
Note that it would also take such a spoofed secret chat an entire month to be created, which is likely to be noticed by the victims.
Our detailed calculations are presented in this article.

Length extension attacks

By definition, length extension attacks are a type of attack when certain types of hashes are misused as message authentication codes, allowing for inclusion of extra information.
A message in MTProto consists of an msg_key, essentially equal to SHA-1 of the plaintext with some additional parameters, followed by the ciphertext. The attacker cannot append extra bytes to the end and recompute the SHA-1, since the SHA-1 is computed from the plaintext, not the ciphertext, and the attacker has no way to obtain the ciphertext corresponding to the extra plaintext bytes she may want to add.
Apart from that, changing the msg_key would also change the AES decryption key for the message in a way unpredictable for the attacker, so even the original prefix would decrypt to garbage — which would be immediately detected since the app performs a security check to ensure the that SHA-1 of the plaintext matches the msg_key